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Special Commentary

The Military as Social Experiment:
Challenging a Trope
Jacqueline E. Whitt and Elizabeth A. Perazzo

T

he phrase “The military is a fighting force, not a social experiment!”
has become something of a rallying cry in contemporary
conservative discourse about the American military. It is usually
deployed in response to policies related to religion, gender, and sexuality.
This phrase, though, misrepresents the real social and political history
of the United States military, and it presents a false choice between
experimentation and effectiveness. In reality, the choice is more complex.
Labels such as “social experiment,” “social laboratory,” “social
engineering,” and “social agenda,” signal opposition to certain kinds
of military personnel policies, and they carry intentionally provocative,
and often partisan, political connotations. Experiments hinge on
uncertainty. They often fail. And although failed experiments may be
a path to deeper understanding, the failures can produce unforeseen
effects or raise undesirable questions. Social experiment connotes both
experimentation on people and manipulation. Social experiment may
echo other unmentioned government-directed experiments or initiatives,
such as those carried out in the Tuskegee syphilis study or in eugenics
and sterilization programs. Engineering suggests manipulation, changes
to the natural order of things. A social agenda signifies a program of
action designed to subvert or to advance a particular political position,
usually at the expense of “traditional” values.
The claim the military should not be a social experiment, the locus
for advancing a social agenda, or a product of social engineering—which
we collectively term the social experiment critique—has been used primarily
by political conservatives to criticize diversifying the American military.
This essay exposes the social experiment critique using two
arguments. First, the social experiment critique fundamentally distorts
the social and political history of the American military and sets up a
false binary: the military can be either an effective fighting force or a
social experiment. This critique further assumes the choice is obvious:
national values must be sacrificed for militarization and military
effectiveness. Yet, the American military has always been a social
experiment, especially when determining who can and cannot serve
and why. Thus, today’s social experiment critique misleads the audience.
Second, the social experiment critique is deployed selectively, namely
against populations other than heterosexual, white, Christian, nativeborn cisgender men in the military. Thus, the social experiment critique
operates as a political trope, gaining traction specifically in conservative
political circles. We demonstrate this rhetorical device by highlighting
the sources of the critique, including mainstream politicians, political
pundits, the media, and the public at large. The participation of veterans
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(especially retired general officers) and currently serving military
members reveals additional complexities about this construct.
Importantly, this commentary is not about whether increased diversity is good or bad for the military, whether women should be integrated
into combat roles, whether transgender people should be allowed to serve,
or whether unit cohesion is an argument worth engaging in the twentyfirst century. Countless other works explore these issues in great depth,
and the issues remain contested. Instead, we trace a specific discourse
and criticize its contemporary usage to encourage military professionals
to engage in meaningful conversations about the relationship between
military effectiveness and inclusivity.

Historicizing the Military Social Experiment

Discussions about the function and composition of the armed
forces must take into account the relationship between the military and
the society it serves. Each society must answer the question of who
fights, and under what terms. In the United States, the ideal has been the
citizen-soldier, motivated by patriotism and American spirit. Historian
Richard H. Kohn has written, “Americans have long believed that how
they have behaved in service and in battle reflected their character
as a people and their virtue as a nation.” 1 Yet this vision glossed the
systematic and purposeful exclusion of many Americans from military
service. Even under conscription regimes, the American military has
never truly been a cross section of American society; rather it has always
been a social experiment—changing over time, cobbling together a
fighting force designed to fight and win the nation’s wars, and signaling
what it meant to be fully American.
The American military has never been homogenous. It has always
limited service based on demographic characteristics such as race, class,
ethnicity, citizenship, religion, gender, and sexuality—often at the
expense of “objective” considerations about military effectiveness. For
most of its history, these categories were used to preserve the prevailing
social and political order based on hierarchies of race, class, ethnicity,
and gender. The American military, defining and redefining itself in
relation to who serves in uniform, cannot truly be understood, except
as a social experiment.
During the American Revolution, the social experiment impulse
meant enshrining in law exemptions based upon racial, economic, and
religious distinctions that valued certain classes of people. The ranks
of the Continental Army were disproportionately filled with men from
the lower third of the socioeconomic ladder and other disadvantaged
groups. In a foundational piece of legislation constituting military force
for the new nation, considerations of race, gender, citizenship, religion,
and class are clearly evident: the Militia Act (1792) called on every “free
able-bodied white male citizen” to enroll in a local militia. But some
state statutes included exemptions—for example, Pennsylvania made
1      Richard H. Kohn, “The Social History of the American Soldier: A Review and Prospectus
for Research,” American Historical Review 86, no. 3 (June 1981): 555. For US military demographics
in the twentieth century, see Jennifer Mittelstadt, “Military Demographics,” in At War: The Military
and American Culture in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, ed. David Kieran and Edwin A. Martini (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2018), 87–107.
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exceptions for congressmen and judges as well as conscientious objectors
and those who had volunteered for military service for seven years.2
During the American Civil War, the military social experiment
was not just about who was included but also about who was excluded.
The Enrollment Act (1863) meant Union men could pay substitutes to
fulfill their enlistment obligations, which reflected the value of wealth
and social class to the obligation of military service. There, draft riots
threatened social and political stability as young men objected to being
sent to war.3 The Confederate States of America wrestled with how to
constitute its army given its smaller pool of available manpower, but
service exemptions, such as the Twenty-Slave Law (1862), and restrictions
on slaves’ military service conveyed the Confederacy’s value of social
order over military effectiveness until the very end of the war.4 In the
Confederacy, the social experiment related to conscription led to the
widespread belief that the Civil War was a “rich man’s war and a poor
man’s fight.” 5 The military social experiment in the mid-nineteenth
century demonstrated the United States and its Confederate enemy could
make decisions about who would fight based on social status rather than
military fitness or political interest.
The United States confronted massive military manpower
requirements during the First World War. Questions about the
relationship between service, citizenship, and equality came to the
forefront of political and military discussions. Conscription required
many, but not all, to serve. In addition to what seemed like obvious
exclusions—women, the disabled, the aged, or the infirm—the legislation
allowed for other exemptions. Exemptions for college students, clergy,
and others in professions deemed vital to the war effort signaled their
political value and caused more lower- and working- class men to be
conscripted. The military also wrestled with questions about citizenship
and military service. Some immigrants were permitted to join the ranks
while others, such as German immigrants, were initially excluded. But
this exclusion, which many in society found unacceptable, shifted the
burden and dangers of service onto native-born whites.6
In the Second World War, maintaining segregated units reified
prevailing social structures. Arguments were couched in grounds of
effectiveness, but little supporting evidence was offered. In a speech to
black newspaper editors, a representative of the Army’s adjutant general
said: “The Army is not a sociological laboratory; to be effective it must
be organized and trained according to the principles which will insure
2      Militia Exemption Books, 1801–13 (PA: Office of the Comptroller General), 6 vols., RG/004/35,
box 1, microfilm roll 5151, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg.
3      Michael T. Meier, “Civil War Draft Records: Exemptions and Enrollments,” Prologue 26, no.
4 (Winter 1994): 282–86; and Barnet Schecter, The Devil’s Own Work: The Civil War Draft Riots and the
Fight to Reconstruct America (New York: Walker, 2009).
4      Paul D. Escott, Military Necessity: Civil-Military Relations in the Confederacy (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006); William L. Shaw, “The Confederate Conscription and Exemption
Acts,” American Journal of Legal History 6, no. 4 (October 1962): 368–405; and Emory M. Thomas,
The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971).
5      For a straightforward expression of this idea, see Charles H. Wesley, The Collapse of the
Confederacy. with a new introduction by John David Smith (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 2001). For a contending interpretation, see Joseph T. Glatthaar “Everyman’s War: A Rich and
Poor Man’s Fight in Lee’s Army,” Civil War History 54, no. 3 (September 2008): 229–46.
6      Nancy Gentile Ford, Americans All! Foreign-born Soldiers in WWI (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2001).

8

Parameters 48(2) Summer 2018

success. Experiments to meet the wishes and demands of the champions
of every race and creed for the solution of their problems are a danger to
efficiency, discipline and morale and would result in ultimate defeat.” 7
In the postwar period, the newly formed Department of Defense
explored options for conducting explicit “experiments” to desegregate
some units.8 But the services objected. In 1948, Harry S. Truman issued
Executive Order 9981, which ordered the desegregation of the armed
forces. But opponents of racial integration, often from within the military,
continued to employ the rhetoric of social experimentation to argue
against the policy. In 1949, for example, Marine Corps Commandant
General Clifton B. Cates argued segregation was a national, rather
than military, problem because the military “could not be an agency
for experimentation in civil liberty without detriment to its ability to
maintain the efficiency and the high state of readiness so essential to
national defense.” 9
During the Vietnam War, local draft boards, wielding complicated
rules about exemptions, held extraordinary power to manipulate which
men served and under what conditions. These boards often exempted
or offered choices to the sons of the wealthy while providing few
alternatives to working class Americans.10 The military social experiment
went apace when it served the interests of the economically and racially
privileged. At the same time, the Department of Defense instituted
another experiment—Project 100,000 that ostensibly aimed to uplift the
“subterranean poor” by lowering conscription standards and allowing
“rejectees” to serve.11 Project 100,000 is almost universally considered
a failed experiment that weakened readiness and effectiveness without
producing positive long-term effects for the populations it sought to
bring into the military.
After the Vietnam War, with the implementation of the all-volunteer
force, the military services made conscious efforts to recruit women
and racial minorities to meet manpower requirements. In practice, this
move meant recruiting, training, retaining, and promoting more women
and more racial and ethnic minorities than previous iterations of the
American force demanded. This expansiveness is most readily evident
in the US Army, which had the highest personnel requirements. The allvolunteer force required recruiting a willing and qualified force, which
was, in theory and reality, a diverse one.12 The all-volunteer force is best
understood as a social experiment that offered a new vision of how the
military would relate to society.
7      Col Eugene R. Householder (speech before Conference of Negro Editors and Publishers,
December 8, 1941), quoted in Morris J. MacGregor Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2001), 23.
8      MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 328–30.
9      Gen Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, for the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Air, memorandum, “Proposed Directive for the Armed Forces for the Period 1 July 1949
to 1 July 1950,” March 17, 1949, AO-1, US Marine Corps files, quoted in MacGregor, Integration of
the Armed Forces, 336.
10      Christian G. Appy, Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1993).
11      Lisa Hsiao, “Project 100,000: The Great Society’s Answer to Military Manpower Needs in
Vietnam,” Vietnam Generation 1, no. 2 (1989): 14.
12      Beth L. Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2009).
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As in the 1940s, critics of expanding access to military service
in the era of the all-volunteer force used pervasive language of social
experimentation to target women in the armed forces who sought
expanded roles as well as servicemembers who were gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender. During the period from 1970 to 1980,
women went from less than one percent of the force to nine percent.
In 1979, James Webb, then a professor at the Naval Academy, lambasted
the integration of women into the armed services and the academies,
accusing politicians of endangering effectiveness in return for political
favor. He wrote the armed forces cannot be “a test tube for social
experimentation. Nowhere is this more of a problem than in the area
of women’s political issues.” 13 Webb joined a loud chorus that used this
particular rhetorical formulation, often embedded with other critiques
about standards, sexuality, and human nature.
The social experiment critique gained momentum throughout the
1990s. Charles Moskos, a prominent military sociologist, suggested the
“postmodern military” wrought unwelcome developments in the civilmilitary arena. At the height of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” debate and
the Clinton administration’s policy toward open homosexual service in
the military, Moskos wrote, “Once thought of as the institution through
which citizens—at least male citizens—discharged their basic civic
obligation, the military is now coming to be seen as a large and potent
laboratory for social experimentation.” After briefly examining the
history of racial integration within the military, he rejected comparisons
between racial integration and integration of women and gay, lesbian, and
bisexual servicemembers: “We live at a time when the combat mission of
the armed forces appears to be of secondary importance. . . . We can only
hope that our postmodern military never has to face the uncivil reality
of war.” 14 Moskos’s article exemplifies the way the social experiment
critique makes a binary distinction between social experimentation and
military effectiveness.
The social experiment critique resonated in popular culture, too. In
the 1997 film G. I. Jane, a female Navy lieutenant is selected to undergo
elite SEAL training—and the men are none too happy about it. In a
confrontation with the commanding officer, the Navy lieutenant says
she believes the commanding officer resents her. The captain, though,
disagrees—at least on the details—and tells her, “What I resent,
lieutenant, is some politician using my base as a test tube for her grand
social experiment.” The captain goes on to elaborate on all of the things
he resents, which he sees as both a violation of his command and the
sanctity of the masculine space of the elite unit.15 In this critique, the
problem was not with the lieutenant as an individual, but with the
perceived encroachment of the outside world on a closed culture and
the deleterious effects of broader representation on the group.
13      James Webb, “Women Can’t Fight,” Washingtonian, November 1, 1979. Webb later became a
senator from Virginia and walked back these comments. Dan Lamothe, “Under Pressure, Jim Webb
Declines To Be Recognized as a Distinguished Naval Academy Graduate,” Washington Post, March
28, 2017.
14      Charles Moskos, “From Citizens’ Army to Social Laboratory,” Wilson Quarterly 17, no. 1
(Winter 1993): 83, 94.
15      C. O. Salem to Lt. Jordan O’Neil in G. I. Jane, directed by Ridley Scott (Caravan Pictures et
al., 1997).
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Contemporizing the Social Experiment Critique

The binary construct pitting experimentation against effectiveness
reveals the politicization of questions about representativeness and
inclusivity in the military. The social experiment critique is used in
conservative media and political circles critical of what they deem to be
politically correct efforts to diversify the force.
At the national level, the Republican Party clearly expressed its
opposition to the advancement of social concerns at the alleged expense
of military readiness and effectiveness. The 2016 Republican Party distinctly stated its intent to repeal inclusivity policies initiated during
President Barack Obama’s term. The platform called for “an objective
review of the impact on readiness of the current administration’s
ideology-based personnel policies,” promised to “correct problems,” and
“reject[ed] the use of the military as a platform for social experimentation,”
which it saw as an attempt to “undermine military priorities and mission
readiness.” 16 The social experimentation is characterized as a direct
threat to military priorities and readiness, but the nonspecific nature of
the critique protects its utility and flexibility as a trope.
Politicians employing the social experiment critique run the risk
of sending mixed messages. The 2016 Republican platform further
states, “We reiterate our support for both the advancement of women
in the military and their exemption from direct ground combat units
and infantry battalions.” Republicans know that the all-volunteer
force cannot function without women, but it also desires to designate
combat as masculine space. But the messaging is inconsistent. In 2016,
Congressman Mac Thornberry (R-TX) stated, “I do not believe that the
military should be an experimental laboratory for social issues.” But he
continued, “I also believe that you focus on capability and getting the job
done, protecting the country, and don’t worry so much about a person’s
color or gender.” 17 Nonetheless, policies that perpetuate systematic
exclusion of certain groups eliminate their chance to demonstrate their
ability to do the job.
The social experiment critique is often voiced by conservative
senior retired military officers attempting to resist civilian-initiated
policy changes that appear to challenge military culture and tradition.
These veterans are powerful messengers, and many are held in high
regard by the public. Before the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was
repealed, more than 1,160 retired generals and admirals signed a letter
stating that repealing this law would have a detrimental effect on the
military.18 These critics objected to involving the military in a social
agenda and insinuated the change would break the all-volunteer force.
Another firestorm of critique using the social experiment language
ignited in late 2015 when Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter opened
all occupational specialties to women. As he reasoned, “the military
16      Republican National Committee (RNC), Republican Platform 2016 (Cleveland, OH: RNC,
2016), 44.
17      Joel Gehrke, “Lawmaker: Obama Using Military for Social Experiments,” Washington
Examiner, February 1, 2016.
18      Aaron Belkin et al., “Readiness and DADT Repeal: Has the New Policy of Open Service
Undermined the Military?,” Armed Forces & Society 39, no 4 (December 2012): 587–601; and
“Concerns Regarding Recruiting, Retention, and Readiness,” Flag and General Officers for the
Military, accessed September 11, 2018.
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services will be better able to harness the skills and perspectives that
talented women have to offer.” 19 This statement, however, was often read
as yet another example of a social agenda being forced on the military.
The social experiment critique emanates from conservative media
and activist organizations as well. A search for “experiment” on the
Center for Military Readiness, a conservative political advocacy group,
yields 156 hits.20 On the Federalist, a conservative online journal that
offers political and cultural commentary, many articles that address
gender, sexuality, or diversity in the military employ the language of
the social experiment critique.21 On social media sites such as Twitter
and Facebook, searches for “military social experiment,” “military
political correctness,” and “military social engineering” yield thousands
of hits, almost all of them decrying inclusivity policies and suggesting
military readiness and effectiveness has been dangerously degraded.
Many participants in these online forums claim to be veterans or
currently serving military members, although such affiliations and
identities are difficult to verify. These phrases and ideas circulate within
a relatively closed ecosystem and generally do not engage with detailed
analysis or evidence. Altogether, the discourse of the contemporary
social experiment critique exists largely separate from the detailed social
and political history of the American military.
Ultimately, the social experiment critique defines military service as
a privilege for those deemed fit to serve rather than a broad obligation
of citizenship. This definition has potentially significant consequences
should the United States find itself in a major war. The perceived value
of military service in the United States changes. Sometimes being in the
military is an honor. The soldier represents the best ideals of the United
States and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Military service
ennobles and valorizes individuals and the state’s purpose, and it confers
respectability and legitimacy on those who serve. At other times, military
service seems a punishment. The military represents the overreach of the
state that magnifies divisions among social classes, and distinctions of
race, class, and gender can be used to marginalize servicemembers when
public support for war ebbs. The social experiment critique finds more
purchase in the first instance, when the “experiment” serves to broaden
representation and inclusion, expanding the boundaries of citizenship
and the legitimacy of American identities. When the experiment serves
to exclude populations in order to preserve perceived social statuses, the
critique is less robust, if it exists at all.

19      Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Opens All Military Occupations, Positions to Women,” Department
of Defense, December 3, 2105.
20      “Search Results: Experiment,” Center for Military Readiness, accessed July 9, 2018.
21      For examples, see Sumantra Maitra, “Dear Trans Lobby: The Military Is Not a Social
Experiment,” Federalist, August 28, 2017; and Walt Heyer, “Thanks to the Trump Administration,
the U. S. Military Will Not Become a Sex-Change Clinic,” Federalist, March 27, 2018.
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